Abstract. We consider a class of symmetric games with externalities across coalitions and show that, under certain regularity conditions, restricting the deviating power to majority guarantees the existence of core-stable allocations. We also show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, stability requires a supermajority rule, whose threshold is increasing in the extraction power.
Introduction
Apart from being a naturally appealing rule to take collective decisions, the simple majority rule has been shown to satisfy a set of desirable axioms on the largest class of preference domains (Dasgupta and Maskin 2008) . Moreover, supermajority rules have been shown to guarantee the existence of a "stable" collective decision under mild restrictions on individual and collective preferences (Caplin and Nalebu¤ 1988) .
In this note we discuss a new, and previously unnoticed, property of majority rules that applies when majority and minorities'members can take actions that a¤ect each other's welfare. Such externalities in collective decisions imply that the expected payo¤s of a coalition of agents'depend on the behaviour of remaining agents in the system. This problem is well known and extensively studied in the theory of coalitional games with externalities (Bloch 1996 , Ray and Vohra 1997, Yi 1997 , Maskin 2003 , Ray 2007 , Hafalir 2007 ). In particular, core allocations fail to exist even when the game possess strong aggregative properties, such as a notion of convexity accounting for externalities (Hafalir 2007) , both when the players in complementary coalitions are assumed to stick together (delta core or core with merging expectations) or when they organize optimally to maximize their own payo¤s (rational expectations core). In this note we show that in all symmetric games with externalities that satisfy certain regularity conditions, restricting the blocking power to majority coalitions guarantees that the core is nonempty for all expectations on players'behaviour. Moreover, we show that if majorities can extract resources from minorities, then stability requires to limit the deviation power to supermajorities, and that the required size increases with the extraction power.
Setup and Notation
2.1. The Strategic Form Game. Let G = (N; (X; u i ) i2N ) be a game in strategic form, with …nite set players N = f1; 2; :::; ng, strategy set X i and payo¤ function u i : X 1 :: X n ! R + for each i 2 N . We assume that G is symmetric and monotone in the following sense: A.1(Symmetry). X i = X for all i 2 N . Moreover, for all x 2 X n and all permutations p : N ! N : u p(i) x p(1) ; :::; x p(n) = u i (x 1 ; :::; x n ). A.2 (Monotone Externalities). One of the following two cases must hold:
(1) Positive Externalities (PE): u i (x) increasing in x N nfig for all i and all x 2 X n ; (2) Negative Externalities (NE): u i (x) decreasing in x N nfig for all i and all x 2 X n .
Coalitions and Coalitional Worth.
A partition = (S 1 ; S 2 ; ::; S j ; ::; S m ) of N describes the cooperation patterns in the game G. Let s j denote the cardinality of S j for all j = 1; 2; ::m. Players belonging to the same coalition in are assumed to cooperate to achieve their maximal joint payo¤. Across coalitions agents set strategies non-cooperatively. Formally, for each partition = (S 1 ; S 2 ; :::; S j ; :::; S m ) we de…ne the game G( ) with player set f1; 2; :::j; ::; mg, each with strategy set X j = X S j and payo¤ function U j = P i2S j u i . Note that the way in which we de…ne the game G( ) implies that our symmetry assumption holds both within and across coalitions in G( ) (compare with the weaker assumption used by Yi 1997) . Under suitable assumptions on payo¤ functions, reaction functions in G( ) are such that all members within a coalition play the same strategy (see Currarini and Marini 2006) . When G( ) possesses a unique Nash Equilibrium, equilibrium payo¤s unambiguously de…ne coalitional worths in . Note that in the present setting, the partition formed by the grand coalition N always generates the maximal aggregate payo¤, and is, in this sense, e¢ cient.
2.3. Core Stability. We will be interested in e¢ cient outcomes of the game G that are stable against objection by subcoalitions of the set N . Because of the presence of externalities, what a coalition expects to obtain by objecting to a proposed allocation crucially depends on what partition it expects to emerge in response to the objection. Let us denote by (S) such expected partition, for all S N . Speci…c cases include the gamma expectation, where players in N nS split up into singletons, the delta expectation, where remaining players merge into the coalition N nS, and the rational expectation, where remaining players are expected to re-organize in the partition of the set N nS that guarantees them the highest aggregate payo¤. Given (S), a characteristic function v(S) is obtained for each coalition S by considering the Nash equilibrium payo¤ of S in the game G( (S)). De…nition 1 The core of the characteristic function game (N; v) consists of all e¢ cient allocations u 2 R n + such that P i2S u i v(S) for all S N . The core concept allows all possible coalitions to object. In this paper we impose a constraint coming from the cardinality of coalitions, and in particular the case in which only coalitions with at least a given percentage beta of all players are allowed to object to proposed e¢ cient allocations. Formally, we will denote by M (N ) the set of all subsets of N that include strictly more than a given percentage of the players in N . When = 50% this reduces to the simple majority rule and, for brevity, we will use the notation M(N ); when > 50% we will use the term supermajority. De…nition 2 The M -core of the characteristic function game (N; v) consists of all e¢ cient allocations u 2 R n + such that
Majorities and Core Stability
We start by recording an important property of the class of games considered here, that was proved in Currarini and Marini (2006) . We denote by u S the per capita payo¤ for members of coalition S, that is, u S = U S =s. Let us also denote by e s the unit vector of dimension s. For each S j 2 , let us denote as x j (x 1 ; :; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; :; x m )e s j the e¢ cient strategy pro…le played by the members of S j given the strategy pro…les (x 1 ; :::; x j 1 ; x j+1 ; :::; x m ) played by the other coalitions in . For brevity, we denote by x j (x k ) the e¢ cient choice of members of S j as a function of the choice of members of S k , keeping all other strategies …xed. De…nition 3 The game G( ) satis…es the "contraction property" if for each two coalitions
Lemma 1. Let G be a symmetric monotonic game. Let also G have either strategic complements or strategic substitutes and the contraction property. For all partition and coalitions S; T in such that t < s, the Nash equilibrium x( ) of the game G( ) satis…es u S (x( )) < u T (x( )).
Under the gamma expectation, Lemma 1 immediately implies that the e¢ cient equal-split allocation in G belongs to the core of (N; v). In fact, any objecting coalition S would face smaller coalitions in the induced partition (S), whose members are better of than the members of S by Lemma 1, contradicting e¢ ciency of the equal split allocation in the …rst place. The same argument does not apply, however, to minority coalitions under the delta expectation, who face a larger coalition in the induced partition (S). The core under the delta expectation may in fact be empty even under the assumptions of Lemma 1. By ruling out the formation of objecting minorities, the simple majority rule generates conditions under which the argument above applies for all types of expectations. In fact, the formation of a majority S is necessarily followed by the formation of smaller coalitions, independently of the particular expectation (S), and the existence of pro…table deviations would, again, contradict the e¢ ciency of the equal split allocation. Proposition 1. Let G be a symmetric monotonic game. Let also G have either strategic complements or strategic substitutes and the contraction property. Then, the M-core of the game G is nonempty for all expectations (S).
3.1. Exploitation of Minorities and Supermajority Rules. As de…ned above, the worth of a majority S is fully determined by the actions of its members and by the external e¤ects of the actions taken by the other players in N . Majorities have, in this sense, no coercive power over minorities. This makes the analysis of the previous section somewhat un…t to describe political or voting processes and their stability. If majorities could extract resources from minorities, the argument of Lemma 1 would not, by itself, guarantee non emptiness of the core. The strategic disadvantage of majorities (as established in Lemma 1) would be counteracted by their extraction power which, if too strong, may undermine stability. In what follows we provide a simple su¢ cient condition under which supermajority rules can restore core-stability under the delta expectation even in the case of minorities' exploitation. A straightforward argument shows that this immediately implies core-stability under all possible expectations. This condition essentially strengthens the property established in Lemma 1 by requiring that the strategic disadvantage of majorities -net of any minority exploitation -increases with their relative size. As we show in section 4, this property is satis…ed in several well-known games in which coalition formation and cooperation are a relevant issue. Let us …rst de…ne
the di¤erence in per capita payo¤s between the coalitions N nS and S in the partition (S) = fS; N nSg at the Nash equilibrium associated to (S). By Lemma 1, (S) > 0 for S > N nS.
A3:
The di¤erence (S) is increasing in s for all s = n 2
.
Consider now the characteristic function v(S) obtained from the game G under the delta expectation. We can de…ned a modi…ed function v (S) that encompasses the extraction of an arbitrary majority coalition S of a per capita worth of z from each member of the minority coalition N nS. The di¤erence between the per-capita payo¤s of a majority coalition S and its complement becomes:
Let Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Let z denote the per-capita worth that majorities can extract from minorities. Then, for each z < (N nfig)
such that the M -core is nonempty. Moreover, is increasing in z.
Proof. The expression (S) can be written as follows:
. This, together with the assumption that z < (N nfig) n 1 n (a bound on the extraction power) guarantees that there exists some given size s < n after which (S) > 0. Lemma 1 and Proposition 1 apply again for all coalitions of size larger than s.
Examples
In this …nal section we present three well-know examples of games falling in the present framework and for which assumption A.3. holds. For these games the size of supermajority required for stability as a function of extraction power can be easily computed.
Oligopoly Games.
In an oligopoly game with identical …rms and no synergies each merger (or cartel) behaves as a macro-player (i.e. as a single …rm). Therefore, in the partition (S) = fS; T g equilibrium pro…ts are such that U N nS (x( (S)) = U S (x( (S)). This implies that (S) is strictly increasing in s for s n=2 and, therefore, Proposition 2 applies. The level of required supermajority increases monotonically with the intensity of minority exploitation. For instance, under linear Cournot oligopoly and normalized demand and cost such that (a c) 2 = 1, for n = 10 if the extraction power is z = 0:0055 the required supermajority is s = 6, while if z = 0:088, s = 9. Similar results can be obtained in all games in which, as in Cournot, coalitional worths in G( ) are independent on coalitional sizes.
4.2.
Public Good Games. Ray & Vohra 1997 consider a game of public goods contribution in which each agent i 2 N contributes x i and receives a payo¤
Computing the equilibrium pro…le x( (S)) we obtain:
which is positive and monotonically increasing in s for s > n 2
. Therefore, A.3 holds and Proposition 2 applies. Note that similar results are obtained in all games for which the function U S (x( (S)) increases more tham proportionally for s 2 0; n 2 and less than proportionally for s 2 n 2 ; n :
4.3. Alliances in Contests. Following a number of recent contributions on alliance formation in contests (see, for instance, Bloch 2011 for a survey), let n players exert e¤ort e i 2 E i and obtain a payo¤ u i : E n ! R + given by
where R is a …xed prize obtained by competing, c(e i ) player i's cost of e¤ort, and ( p(e) = e i P i2N e i 1 if P i2N e i > 0 and 1 jN j otherwise is a contest-success function typical of rent-seeking games (Tullock 1987) . The e¤ort of each player a¤ects her probability to access prize (here …xed for simplicity).
When only two coalitions S and T compete for prize, it can be shown that Lemma 1 applies. Moroever, numerical simulations show that, with quadratic costs equal to c(e i ) = 
Concluding Remarks
We have shown that in symmetric games with no synergies the simple majority rule restricts coalitions'blocking power so to guarantee the existence of core-stable allocations. We have also argued that supermajorities may be required to ensure stability when majorities possess exploitation rights over minorities.
